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 Resentment and Religion – Modern Dialogue  
between Europe and the Non-European 
Georg Stauth 
1. ›Europe‹ and Resentment 
An essential component of the proposed normalization of the relation between 
Europe and Islam is the key role that Europe could play in promoting a new type of 
self-definition for Muslims. It is important to note that, in this debate, poverty, 
conflict, and cultural deprivation among non-Westerners and in the non-Western 
world are often seen as being overloaded by »resentment«. On the other hand, non-
European thinkers often refer to »resentment« and unlimited Western instrumenta-
lism and materialism. My aim in this article is to highlight some of the paradoxes 
and misunderstandings circulating in this debate. 
Since Nietzsche’s shattering attack on the morality of resentment and Christia-
nity, much of the modern discourse on religion and Western modernity rests largely 
on questions as to how to come to grips with Nietzsche’s critique and his attack on 
the Christian priest. In response to this attack, the issue of resentment was turned 
into an underlying pattern for understanding the sublime and diverse directions of 
secularization. Islam is the religion without priests, but what does it mean in this 
context? In contrast, European self-understanding rests on the »priest« as a relati-
vely independent power-neutral or even power-challenging institution. Is there less 
»resentment« in modern Islam? This is a contradiction that deserves reflection.  
Max Weber defined the limits for an approach to modernity that depends largely 
on the independent role of modern bureaucratic rationality. From Weber’s perspec-
tive the secular turn in the transition from »priest« to »Amt« (i.e. office) is an institu-
tional achievement. On the other hand, non-European and Islamic thinkers have 
referred to this syndrome in arguing that the West is the throne of secular nihilism, 
the morality of resentment, and materialism. What does it mean to criticize the West 
in these terms? To what extent have modern religious intellectuals themselves be-
come involved in the morality of resentment when responding to Nietzsche’s »Kul-
turkritik«? In forming a framework of reference for counter-concepts, responding to 
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new institutional contexts and demands, the critique of the West is easily converted 
into ›authentic‹ principles of religious tradition (Stauth 1999). The paradox is that 
Islamic religious affirmation apparently assumed alternative paths of modernity 
while at the same time being fully included in the dialogical framework of moder-
nity. This makes theorizing dialogue difficult. Despite alternative rhetoric, new 
critical concepts of de-colonization and de-Westernization of culture and science 
became largely motivated and linked to Islam. Overall, the use of Western tools of 
cultural production, including a general syndrome of resentment, is now part of a 
generalized modern dialogue and of the diverse multiple formations of the cultural 
programs of modernity.  
Europe itself is undergoing a process of unification and expansion. This process 
has reinstated the problem of modern culture and religion and the debate as to the 
declared universal terms of self-definition can be broadened could easily take a new 
and contradictory turn. On the one hand, European unity and expansion will not 
succeed if its culture were to be merely perceived in religious terms as being – bet-
ween critique and affirmation – essentially Christian. On the other hand, to give up 
an old idea in European thought could in itself be judged as being based on a tradi-
tion of falsely motivated altruism. Competing universalist programs for the Christi-
aniziation or Islamization of modernity are largely counter-productive, inciting 
conflict rather than solving problems and producing moments of cultural retarda-
tion rather than of human progress. Certainly, the modern presence of Islam in 
Europe appears to be linked to various and, possibly competing, attempts to view 
the ›new‹ Europe as a ›higher‹ stage of cultural composition. However, the ›new‹ 
Europe will not solve the existing national problems of cultural confrontation with 
Islam unless an open debate about the critical cultural issues takes place. Despite all 
difference, there seems to be no alternative to developing an inclusive conceptual 
terrain in viewing the world outside of ›Europe‹. In addition to reason, asceticism, 
and resentment, other more inclusive terms of reference will have to be developed. 
However, it is time for opening up this debate on the cultural future of Europe by 
incorporating the perspective on as cultural a tool as resentment which has shaped 
the inner culture of Europe so decisively and, more specifically, the human charac-
ter which it represents. 
2. The Sociology of Modernity 
As described above, the concept of resentment remains meaningless without being 
linked to the modern discourse of culture and the construction of power. When we 
ask after the sociological aspects of Nietzsche’s critique of modernity and its impact 
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on the theory of modernity, it becomes quite clear that the Nietzschean diagnosis of 
modern nihilism has led to the most serious scientific consequences. We should 
note that with respect to Christianity and its impact on modernity, Georg Simmel, 
Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch, Max Scheler, Sigmund Freud, and Karl Jaspers are 
perhaps the best known figures in modern thought who engaged strongly with 
Nietzsche. Weber, for example, argued that we should forget Nietzsche’s negative 
reduction of Christian ethics to resentment. He stressed Christian virtues of acos-
mistic love, brotherhood, and absolute altruism. In fact, Weber’s sociology of reli-
gion turned into an ambivalent intellectualist and moralistic affirmation of asceti-
cism, individualism, professionalism, and institutional rationalization. The program 
was to save science from religion and from the Nietzschean critique of the religious 
bondage of science. In general, up to today, Christian ethics stood in modern theory 
in relative interdependence with the modern processes of rationalization of social 
institutions and individual life worlds, the moral foundation of the individual social 
actor and responsibility. It is my personal conviction – which I should state here 
right from the start –, and certainly an underlying point of reference for all that 
follows, that the indirect and ambivalent dependence of modern social theory on 
Christian concepts of morality – in fact its being the hidden core – is one of the 
basic constraints to open dialogue and cultural exchange in a modern world that 
depends largely on the cultural reconstructions of civilizational differences. I have 
previously agued that »Weber’s sociology of meaningful action purports to offer a 
›positivistic‹ sociological reinterpretation of Nietzsche« (Stauth 1992: 230). Certainly, 
Max Weber’s sociological constructions remain foundational to all modern social 
theory and this should be taken into account. However, I will refrain in this article 
from elaborating further on Weber’s vision of Nietzsche. My reflections, here, are 
on resentment, Europe and the non-European, and I will instead depart with some 
reflections on Karl Jaspers, Max Scheler, and Sigmund Freud.  
Mainstream sociology today re-institutes the fact that both Nietzsche and Sche-
ler would have agreed that resentment characterizes modern culture, but as a result 
of bourgeois society and not Christianity. This is a point to which Freud would have 
subscribed with his thesis on sublimation as the ascetic cost of civilization. In this 
sense, resentment has often been described as a contingent attitude in the moment 
of envy or as a reactive or reflexive feeling resulting from general powerlessness. 
This would, indeed, minimize the discussion of the problem to a frequent, however, 
potentially abolishable psychological condition of mass society and modernity. 
Indeed, to review resentment purely in terms of a fundamental cultural attitude of 
self-empowerment of the weak would again limit our perspective to mere positivist 
psychological considerations. The task set here is a critical sociological one related 
to cross-cultural analysis. 
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3. The Global Issue 
Although the concept of resentment is widely used today, it often remains restricted 
to the meaning of a psychology of envy and hate of the socially and culturally depri-
ved. The processes and actions to which the concept of resentment now refers are 
largely seen as those of the have-nots and the powerless. Recent interpretations of 
Max Scheler’s work have perceived resentment in its ultimate state as a psychology 
of terrorism (Frings 2004: XVIII-XX). Although often using it in a very limited 
psychological sense, psychologists have contributed considerably to the enormous 
increase in the diffused usage of the term today. Sociologists and political scientists 
remain ambiguous in their often very loose use of the term. A good example of this 
ambiguity is perhaps Richard Sennett’s denunciation of the secular charisma of 
Richard Nixon among the American middle class in the 1970s as being retrieved 
from the »politics of resentment« (Sennett 1983: 314). 
As opposed to these examples, the main focus of my discussion lies on resent-
ment and religion. This includes an exploration of the theory of modernity and the 
roots of the modern in ancient religious developments. Coming from this angle, the 
following three points are of analytical importance: 
Firstly, the concept of the morality of resentment should be treated as an essen-
tial and irreversible cultural »break« in the history of civilizations. The issue of re-
sentment can not be dealt with separately from the issue of the rise of the West and 
the fundamental institutional and intellectual changes which we have come to refer 
to since Karl Jaspers as the Axial Age, i.e. the millennium which is associated with 
the rise of monotheism and the monotheistic world religions. As in relation to 
Nietzsche’s discovery of the morality of resentment, it is linked with the respective 
rise of the priesthood as a public religious institution.  
Secondly, there is the problem of the morality of resentment being absent from 
the focus of mainstream modern discourse. It is, however, an inherent concept of 
the discursive treatment of the effects of rationalism and asceticism on the human 
character. The point I would like to make here is very simple: it is time to come to 
grips with the issue of resentment and to treat it openly as an irreversible tool of 
cultural and political construction and action. Certainly, and this is the main issue on 
the contemporary scene, as a tool resentment has enormous effects with respect to 
cross-cultural communication.  
Thirdly, it is not only due to Edward Said’s (2003) latest discussion of Freud and 
the Non-European that the issue of the Non-European and the Non-Western in gene-
ral, became imminent to modern discourse. There is a continual process of modern 
inclusion of 20th century Islam, in the course of which, in recent years, the new 
»this-worldly« ideological orientations of Islam became fully obvious. It is certainly 
difficult to address a kind of genealogy of resentment with respect to the rise of 
 S T A U T H :  R E S E N T M E N T  A N D  R E L I G I O N  251  
 
Islam, or to give a direct answer to the question as how the resentment issue should 
be treated in the context of the process of the universalization of individualism, 
egalitarianism, and democracy. Taking Nietzsche seriously, it would appear that 
Eastern religions and, particularly the latecomer among the world religions, Islam, 
have avoided the institution of the priest as such or have maintained different 
treatments of asceticism and inner-worldly attitudes of the self through respective 
religious solutions intended to avoid or reverse the resentment break. It is difficult 
to see that such a statement could withhold the facts of the internal development of 
these religions in modern times. As for today, we can see that resentment politics 
have become of – at least – corresponding importance in all parts of the non-Euro-
pean world; in fact, they have assumed their own dynamic there. The point I wish 
to develop here again is that we will hardly be able to come to grips with these 
developments if we continue to blame the other without openly disclosing the dou-
ble-sided mechanisms that underlie the process of resentment politics today. To 
stipulate – indirectly or openly, intentionally or unintentionally – the political con-
trol of millions of people by the smallest and lowest of fanatic religious preachers 
and, having done this, to potentially legitimize the use weapons of mass destruction 
and atomic power against them is perhaps another of the nihilist and destructive 
ends of what Nietzsche called the most atomistic revolution.  
4. Nietzsche’s Critical Departure 
A few words on Nietzsche: in a strict genealogical sense, he made a strong distinc-
tion between revenge and resentment. For Nietzsche resentment is not just reactive 
psychology, it includes and incorporates the institutional field of religion, the body, 
a specific this-worldly attitude, the mind, and knowledge. Nietzsche treated Judaism 
differently to Christianity. While he rejected the religious orientation to reality, in 
general, and treated religion as a kind of renunciation of passions and denial of life, 
he saw in Christianity the start of the institutionalization of guilt and resentment. In 
other words, starting from Nietzsche, resentment belongs to the broad syndrome of 
the »ascetic cost of reason« (Foucault 1988)1, of which Weber and Foucault have 
given us appropriate modern accounts. For Nietzsche, most ambiguously, resent-
ment features as a negative tool of cultural reconstruction, a result of both axial 
forms of negation of power and modern reproductions of priestly tastes. Today we 
would say, perhaps, that resentment is one of the modern technologies of cultural 
—————— 
 1 Author’s own translation from the German edition (Foucault 1993: 25). 
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constitution which has become part and parcel of the diverse and multiple formula-
tions of the cultural programs of modernity throughout the world.  
Nietzsche’s discovery that the inner motivations of modern man rest on the re-
ligious institution of the priest and his diagnosis of modern nihilism has had very 
serious scientific consequences. Nietzsche relates resentment and priesthood to a 
kind of evolutionary process from Judaism to Christianity to Protestantism to secu-
lar modernity and to the modern culture of the sciences. This was a very challenging 
idea in late 19th and early 20th century. Nietzsche’s genealogy of morals threatened 
the concept of Christian »love« in saying it was invented out of low and fearful 
reactions to the concept of the »revengeful« God. It should be noted that, for 
Nietzsche, Christian altruism and the Christian way of generalizing morals, and 
specifically the moral of love, produced a kind of inner self-distancing and disinter-
est towards the lived-in-world. This image of the moral and cognitive désinteressé 
weighed heavily on modern post-Nietzschean philosophers. Modern thought was 
and is, perhaps, still strongly engaged in a process of converting Nietzsche’s reduc-
tion of Christian ethics and his pessimistic understanding of acosmistic love, broth-
erhood, and absolute altruism into a positive view on intellectualism, rationalism, 
and modern science. The affirmative project of modernity is largely engaged in a 
reversion of Nietzsche’s critique, turning it into an ambivalent intellectualist and 
moralistic affirmation of asceticism, individualism, professionalism, and institutional 
rationalization. The problem was to save science from its religious bondage.2  
5. Affirmative Revisions: Weber, Scheler, Deleuze 
I would now like to explore briefly three examples of repression or the limitation of 
resentment in modern discourse.3 I will start with Max Weber’s distinction between 
– what he calls – the »Jewish religiosity of retribution« (die jüdische Vergeltungsreligi-
osität) (Weber 1980: 302) or the »specifically obtrusive resentment of a Pariah peo-
ple« (das spezifisch penetrante Ressentiment des Pariavolks) (Weber 1980: 304), on the one 
hand, and the »joyful message« (frohe Botschaft) and »acosmistic love« (akosmistische 
Liebe) (Weber 1980: 203ff.) of Jesus and his followers, on the other. This distinction 
appears to serve the purpose of idealistically freeing Christian religiosity of resent-
ment. However, Weber’s call for limiting the »significance of the factor of resent-
ment« and his attack on Nietzsche’s »dubiousness in applying the conceptual 
schema of ›repression‹ almost universally« (the German – obviously Freudian – 
—————— 
 2 For more detailed discussions of these issues, see Stauth and Turner (1986, 1988) and Stauth (1992). 
 3 For an extremely neutral and logical-pragmatic discussion of resentment, see Strawson (1976). 
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word used here is Verdrängung)4 appears to reveal that his attack on Nietzsche is 
more broadly concerned with denying an inherent relation between class and psy-
chological determination. Weber’s intention, in fact, points to the saving of »priest-
hood«, religious, and modern intellectualism in general from indulging the morality 
of resentment. Modernity could not be judged as being inclined to the kind of mo-
rality based on the lower instincts of the negatively privileged or to »the slave’s 
revolution of morality«. In declining resentment as a tool of cultural re-construc-
tion, Weber makes it an issue of low class and negatively privileged. Hence, the 
issue remains indirectly and silently incorporated into Weber’s main interest in and 
awareness of the »iron cage« of modernity.  
In contrast to Weber and his class psychology, Max Scheler engages in a differ-
ent conceptual limitation, restricting the resentment issue to value and knowledge 
generalization. For Scheler, any cultural resistance lies in the recreation of religious 
principles and visions. This poses a problem with respect to the moral bondage of 
knowledge. Wertgegenständlichkeit means the bondage of value to objective experi-
ence. The need to transcend it is the source of basic cultural reconstitution. Scheler 
agrees with Nietzsche that identifying an individual value object and tying it to the 
general fate of humanity as a whole, is an invention of priestly pathos. However, for 
Scheler, this is a general condition of the human experience and a tool for instigat-
ing the process of generalizing recognition. Generalization remains for Scheler a 
surrogate of value immediacy (Scheler 2004: 88ff.). Linked to this transformation, 
Scheler admits, resentment turns into a modern condition of value generalization 
(Wertverallgemeinerung). This is where Scheler limits the problem of resentment to the 
question of the moral impact on recognition and knowledge. The question that 
arises here is what are the effects of transforming a very individual and critical value 
observation into a general culturally recognized affirmative position? This Scheler 
problem had an influence on modern scientific discourse. Scheler, anticipating later 
projects involving ›smoother‹ adaptations of science and technology, argued – to 
limit the modern impact of resentment – for a return to value immediacy against the 
moral construction of generalizations linked to the rise of modern bourgeois soci-
ety.5 
Finally, I see Gilles Deleuze as completing Weber and Scheler’s secularizing 
transformations of the resentment issue. He re-positions Nietzsche’s theory of 
resentment with respect to modern character and psychology. In his study on 
Nietzsche and philosophy, Deleuze (1962) initially reduces resentment to a psy-
chological problem of the interplay between active and reactive human forces. Re-
—————— 
 4 See Weber (1978, I: 499; English version) or Weber (1980: 304; German). 
 5 On a kind of silent impact on the idea of the immediate object of value, see Dumont (1983: 237) 
and Robertson (1992: 25). 
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sentment begins where reaction, as a normal, corrective, psychological force to 
action, stops. Reaction becomes blocked by resentment and is reversed to become 
an inner feeling. Similar to Freud, Deleuze stresses internalization as a tool of con-
stituting power. Moreover, Deleuze returns to the civilizational issue and, based on 
Nietzsche, defines the impact of Christianity as the combination of an »increase in 
suffering through the change in the direction of resentment« (Vermehrung des Leidens 
durch Richtungsänderung des Ressentiments) and – in a Freudian sense – the »internaliza-
tion of suffering through the change in the direction of resentment« (Verinnerlichung 
des Leidens durch Richtungsänderung des Ressentiments) (Deleuze 1976: 139ff.) It is im-
portant to note that Deleuze agrees with Nietzsche on the impact of the rise of 
priesthood in the Jewish and Christian religions and refers to the priest as the very 
inventor of the change in the direction of resentment (Deleuze 1976: 143ff.). In 
conclusion, Deleuze stages the rise of modernity as the threefold victory of the 
reactive forces of resentment, bad conscience, and the ascetic ideal. However, rather 
than speaking of the psychology of individual powerlessness, Deleuze leads us to 
the genealogy of the inner empowerment of modern subjectivity through forms and 
tools of detachment and distinction.  
6. The Axial Age Impact and its Impasse 
The main theme of resentment is that it is exclusively linked to the genealogical 
view of the late 19th and early 20th centuries in terms of the definition of European 
modernity. It is only with Karl Jaspers’s theory of the Axial Age that the problem of 
resentment and religion takes a universal dimension. It was Karl Japers who, in 
19496, in a significant parallel to Nietzsche’s genealogy of the priest, re-positions the 
priest into a perspective of historical objectivism for research. In a remarkable in-
clusion of Asia, Karl Jaspers developed his thesis that in around the 1st millennium 
BC, in a period of crisis for the old mythical civilizations of antiquity, new spiritual 
and intellectual solutions emerged that prompted an intellectual revolution. Benja-
min Schwartz – the famous scholar of Greek antiquity – called this »a pathos of 
negation and constraint vis-à-vis the forces of human pride and passion« (Schwartz 
1975: 1). Schwartz also speaks of a period of change in the cultural landscape of the 
Eastern Mediterranean between Greece and Egypt, Cyprus and Babylon in the  
1st millennium BC. The intellectual revolution relates to new critical religious-philo-
sophical movements. Transcendental visions and principles were used as tools for 
—————— 
 6 Not to forget his previous profound treatment of the issue of resentment in his lecture on 
»Nietzsche und das Christentum« (Jaspers 1938). 
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envisioning and constructing new »this-worldly« social orders. A new ethos of mo-
rality was created by professional specialists and submitted to transcendental orien-
tations, the control and interpretation of which were left to the new stratum of 
priestly and intellectual professions. Priests and other religious figures began to 
challenge the stability and the power centers. Indeed, heterodoxism and »negation« 
destroyed the circular character of history in the empires of late antiquity. It may be 
noted here that from the 1960s on this was perceived as a kind of archaic version of 
modernization – the arch-model of the historical breakthrough of autonomous 
intellectualism. Later, cross-civilizational analysis developed this theme as the 
prevalence in the modern world of the tension between critical and affirmative 
intellectualism, heterodoxism and orthodoxism, linked to the evolution of egalitari-
anism and modern democracy (Eisenstadt 1998).  
In his book On Origin and Aim of History7 of 1949, Jaspers sketches the rise of Is-
lam as being inherent to the rise of the West8. Indeed, Europe, Byzantium, and 
Islam appear here as equivalent stages in the development of the Western part of 
the world. However there is no further mention of Islam in the text itself. The 
Middle East and Europe »stand as a relative unity vis-à-vis India and China« (Jaspers 
1949a: 101) and Islam remains an absent category in the process of West-East dif-
ferentiation, even in the period following the Greek antiquity. For Jaspers, the 
three-fold historical change in China, India, and the West represents »a demand for 
unlimited communication«. He sees this demand for communication as the best 
means against the »failure of exclusiveness« bound with pure truth of belief. For 
him »the exclusiveness of a claim of truth is a tool of fanaticism. It is inherent not 
only in the instrumentalization of religion, but also in the arrogance of secularism 
and so-called scientific world views« (Jaspers 1949a: 8).  
In contrast to Jaspers’s theory, the unfolding of the communication process in 
the modern world of today is overloaded with fanaticism and conflict and not – it 
would seem – with understanding. So what happened? My point is that Jaspers’s 
perspective on the universality of the Axial Age experience and communication 
needs to be modified to include the universality of resentment. The treatment of 
resentment and religion today longs for the comprehensive inclusion of the Non-
European. Despite all Weberian and Jasperian reservations, I wish to propose to 
treat the issue of resentment as a global issue of religion and modernity. Given the 
limits of time, I would like to raise briefly two questions with respect to Islam: 
—————— 
 7 My comments are based on the original German text Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte 
(Jaspers 1949a: 48).  
 8 See also his article of the same year Die Achsenzeit der Weltgeschichte in Der Monat (Jaspers 
1949b). In this short article, when presenting his theory of the »Axial Age«, Jaspers argued that the 
unity of the experience of the revelation is the unity of the axial experience, a threefold experience 
between China, India, and the West. 
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firstly, the question of the so-called Western impingement on Islam; and, secondly, 
the question of inner reflexive evolution in Islam. 
7. Islam and the Ideology of Religious Abolishing of Resenment 
With respect to Western impingement, I will explore briefly three basic momentums 
that denominate the new awareness and meaning of Islam and that have led to the 
transformation of the modern arenas of Islam.  
Firstly, the process of de-colonization has triggered a deep ideological crisis. It 
became obvious in the context of post-colonialism that the conceptual apparatus of 
Enlightenment and modernity – based on a critique of religion – was inherent to 
colonial power. In the colonized world, »secularization« suddenly appeared to be a 
strategic concept of cultural domination. Islam was recognized as emerging from a 
silent culture of the marginalized and impoverished popular masses and assumed a 
new significance in the process of modern reconstruction. In many ways it was 
perceived as a functional substitute for Protestantism. The momentum of the de-
colonization of culture facilitated the emergence of Islam as a global ideological 
force. It led to a completely new conceptualization of religion as a form of return of 
the suppressed, a momentum of civil rebellion and the organization of a symboli-
cally empowered public self (Fanon, Shariati, Bennabi, Mawdudi, Abdelmalik, etc. in 
opposition to von Grunebaum, B. Lewis, and the other Western authors who 
warned of a »return of Islam«).  
Secondly, the idea of Islam as a process of civil society and of public religion 
propelled by media globalization, consumer culture, and migration emerged in the 
1990s. The re-conceptualization of Islam was also linked to the concomitant de-
composition of the Western image of the »civilized man« and his semantic institu-
tional fields. Islam appeared as a movement fostering new alternative cultural and 
institutional programs of modernity in a non-European context (Robertson, Selig-
man, Eisenstadt, Casanova, Arkoun, Asad, etc.).  
Thirdly, recently, the idea of the self-determined and self-regulated subject and 
the various facets of religious self-empowerment became linked with Islamic recon-
struction. Key-words here include liminality, total autonomy, and actualizing the 
self. »Islam« assumed the importance of a new cultural tool with respect to the 
transcendence of the self, the disciplinary and visionary techniques of »real« and 
»imaginary« transformation, and the body (Foucault, Turner, etc.). 
As you will understand, I have translated the »impingement of the West« issue 
into a broader movement for the re-conceptualization of religion on the contempo-
rary scene of the past 30 years, within which these various momentums signalize in 
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different terms and in diverse directions the main arenas in which Islam became 
directly or indirectly re-conceptualized into the inner engine of modern cultural and 
political discourse.  
It is necessary to go one crucial point further here and to consider that under 
modern global circumstances the issue concerning the morality of resentment was 
literally transformed into an underlying theme of Islamic reconstruction. Aware of 
the discursive integration of Islam, Islamic intellectuals and religious institutions 
maintained a sort of relentless »pathos of distance« towards what they called the 
»nihilism« of modernity and the West. The very intellectual products of Islam took 
on a defensive and at the same time reconstructive stance defining an exclusive 
intellectual hegemony over human character and social accommodation. I should 
mention here Mohammad Iqbal, a leading figure of Islam in India, Pakistan, and 
South-East Asia in the first half of the 20th century and his vision of – as he called 
it – the »spiritual democracy as the ultimate aim of Islam« (Iqbal 1954: 180). Iqbal 
signifies the post-Nietzschean international reconstruction of Islam as a spiritual 
rule and a method for accessing reality. In fact, Iqbal speaks of the Kantian »I can« 
as a momentum of Islamic Sufism (Iqbal 1954: 198). 
Certainly, Islamic reconstruction is not one-dimensional and Iqbal’s influence 
on Islamic thinkers in the Middle East is very limited. However, the general idea of 
Islam as being resistant to Western decadence, resentment, injustice, and false 
secular methodization, is a widespread pattern of thought among all Islamic intel-
lectuals. 
8. The Global Inscription of Resentment 
»There is no doubt in Islam!« according to Mohammad Naqib al-Attas, a contempo-
rary Islamic theorist who is influential in Malaysia and Indonesia.9 Can one say this? 
Can one really claim – as I did above – that »(t)here is no priesthood in Islam«, 
indirectly arguing that there is no resentment in Islam. Why there is self-affirmation 
not self-restraint in confronting the obviously greater powers? Why stones against 
tanks? Why suicide bomb attacks against non-combatants? Can one really claim that 
these are acts and convictions that relate to Islamic dogma and world-view? There is 
no serious evaluation of the concept of resentment with respect to any religious 
institution in Islam, nor with the interplay of resentment in cross-cultural exchange. 
—————— 
 9 Personal communication in a discussion on Nietzsche and Islam in 1995. As for al-Attas’s basic 
reversion of Western cultural criticism into a new path of Islamic reconstruction see his Islam, Secu-
larism and the Philosophy of the Future (Al-Attas 1985). 
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For Nietzsche, Jesus reflects a type of unintended cause of slave mentality in the 
ethical pathos of the West – denied and affirmed in later discourse about religion 
and modernity. In contrast Nietzsche viewed Muhammad as the founder of an 
aristocratic moral pathos. We may regret the neglect of any spirit of critique with 
respect to both the power image of Muhammad and the effect of it on Muslim 
moral affirmativeness, so relentlessly controlled by Orthodox intellectual politics. 
The reflexive breaks in Islamic history came through Western science, viewed often 
enough as »Orientalist« resentful distortions by the West. 
My concern lies – in the broadest sense – with the type of nihilistic spirals of 
performative games, declining the common roots, stages, and breaks in the creation 
of different forms of religious institutions and the related types of morality of re-
sentment. These are emerging today with non-reflective violent tools based on 
cultural falsifications. In the context of the contemporary breaks and turns, we can 
observe the unfolding of the interplay of different resentment politics building on 
the global inscriptions and institutionalized forms of morality of resentment. From 
the limited perspective of »resentment and religion«, I merely wished to point to 
some of the fundamental gaps and misunderstandings that are prevalent in the 
contemporary process and in the dialogue and cultural exchange between Islam and 
the West. 
The conventional wisdom about a resentment-free modern secular science and 
the affirmative intellectual culture of the West has proven wrong. The »return of 
religion« shows the effects of the global incitement of institutionalized forms of 
resentment and of political theology as a means of empowerment. In Karl Jaspers’s 
terminology we may call this a reinvention of pre-Axial or early Axial forms of 
empowerment with disastrous effects. I have pointed to the limitations of the cri-
tique of Western affirmative culture. Any meaningful cross-cultural dialogue would 
have to imply the provision of inner Western cultural critique as a kind of inclusion 
in the terms of business.  
This is what I could envisage as an important dimension of a new European 
stance on the inner modern presence of Islam, challenging Muslims to reflect and 
make similarly available today a falsely and wrongly imagined ethic of power, undis-
putable self-affirmation, and visions of world conquest.  
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